Against Four Enemies Read online

  3 Squadron had moved to Benina, for the defence of Benghazi. German aircraft began to appear, but were hard to catch.

  3 Squadron had a change of command, Peter Jeffrey taking over from Ian McLachlan when McLachlan was promoted to wing commander and command of RAF Station Benina. Jeffrey had been Alan Rawlinson’s first flying instructor in 1938.

  The first Luftwaffe elements arrived – Junkers Ju87 Stukas of Stukageschwader 3 (StG3) and Messerschmitt Bf110 ‘Destroyers’ of III Gruppe Zerstorergeschwader 26 (III/ZG26). Both these types had been battered in the Battle of Britain, to the extent that the Bf110s, escort fighters, had to be escorted by Bf109s.

  The Ju87 had been withdrawn from operations over England in August, during the Battle of Britain, when over thirty had been lost and many others damaged in a few days.

  February 1941 –

  Hawker Hurricanes

  The early part of the months saw the squadron gradually accept the Hurricanes. On 3 February, Alan Rawlinson went back to begin converting to the fighter.

  The Australian prime minister, Robert Menzies, visited the squadron at Benina on 11 February.

  Two days later, a Junkers Ju88 attacked the airfield and dropped bombs but did no damage. The pilot achieved surprise and was long gone before anyone could get airborne after him.

  The squadron Hurricanes began patrolling Benghazi. A Ju88 made a return visit on 15 February but this time Pilot Officer John Saunders caught it and shot it down into the sea.

  The next big day for the squadron came on 18 February. In the afternoon three Hurricanes, flown by Flight Lieutenant Gordon Steege, John Jackson and Saunders were patrolling at 5,000 feet when Jackson noticed some Ju87s low down. In the combat he claimed one destroyed and two damaged, Steege claimed four damaged and Saunders reported damage to two. However, army reports confirmed destruction of eight, and these were allocated as three each to Steege and Jackson and two to Saunders.

  These brought Steege’s victories to four, and were Jackson’s first.

  This was another boost to 3 Squadron, added to that of having larger formations of Italian fighters refuse combat. It also showed that the stories from England of the vulnerability of the Ju87 to British fighters were true, and ‘Stuka parties’ could be expected.

  The appearance of tactical support aircraft like the Junkers Ju87 was an indicator that a German air element of fighters and bombers was in the region. It was unlikely that unescorted bombers would continue to appear, and this proved to be so.

  More Stukas from II/StG2 were engaged next day, with Messerschmitt Bf110 long-range fighters as escort, and two Hurricanes were lost from the three engaged, with two enemy claimed destroyed. Flying Officer Gatward was killed. John ‘Jock’ Perrin, a class-mate of Rawlinson, shot down one Ju87 and one Bf110, but then was hit, on fire, and had to force-land. The 110s continued to attack him on the ground. This hardened the attitude of 3 Squadron towards the enemy.

  Perrin had suffered burns and injury to an eye. He was attended to in Tobruk and put aboard a hospital ship. This was later attacked and sunk by Ju87s, and he had to swim to shore, but survived and returned to the squadron.

  Despite the arrival of the Germans, 3 Squadron flew throughout the weeks until the end of March with only one more combat in the air, when a Ju88 was shot down on 28 February.

  On 1 March the squadron had nineteen Hurricanes, two Lysanders and 24 pilots, while squadron strength was 224 all ranks.

  Rawlinson had flown some patrols in Hurricanes, the first on 28 February, and on 4 March flew a tactical reconnaissance in the Agheila area. He had engine trouble and had to force-land, with damage to the Hurricane and a slight injury to an eye.

  The squadron flew as ordered but without contact. On 8 March alone Hurricanes scrambled ten times to intercept enemy aircraft reported in the area but no contact was made. This went on day after day.

  Hurricanes strafed a landing ground on 16 March, but there was only one SM79 on the ground, so the troops and gun positions felt the effect of the machine guns. Six days later, three Hurricanes were refuelling at Agedabia when three Bf110s made a low-level attack but did not hit the fighters.

  Next day, the squadron received the instructions from higher headquarters that said the overall operational situation was understood at higher command, and it was realised that an enemy ground attack could not be held, so the squadrons were told to prepare to retreat according to a plan, if needed.

  Twelve Hurricanes took off on 31 March, and at Agedabia engaged two Bf110s, shooting down one, from 7/ZG26, and then attacked ten BR20, damaged some but could not claim any destroyed.

  The squadron had twenty Hurricanes and nineteen pilots at the end of March.

  That day the expected enemy attack began, and on 3 April 3 Squadron was ordered back from Benina to Maraua, well to the east. So began a series of moves to the east, with great pressure on the squadron ground staff, to see that nothing of use was left behind, driving in sand storms, or at night with little light, for hours on end, with the aircraft to be serviced at the stops, and then more packing and moving. Bf110s strafed the squadron at one stop, and wounded two men.

  The ground forces were in retreat, pushed hard by Rommel’s tanks and artillery and Tobruk was besieged, with the 9th Australian Division and some British units, inside the Italian defences. Tobruk was vital to the campaign in North Africa, as the only good port between Tunisia and Alexandria in Egypt. German radio propaganda soon broadcast messages that called the troops rats in a trap, but this became an honoured title and ‘Rats of Tobruk’ went into Australian history. The division changed its colour patch to the letter ‘T’.

  Just as Rommel was an outstanding commander, so the Australian general, Leslie Morshead, was his equal. A veteran of Gallipoli, France and Belgium 1915-18, Morshead was not about to be panicked by his situation, nor by the impressive reputation enjoyed by the German armed forces in 1941. Morshead calmly assessed his situation and his advantages.

  In Europe the combined effect of close air support, artillery, engineers, armour and infantry working together had been successful. The Poles, Danes, Dutch, Belgians and French had been incapable of withstanding the effect of a blitzkrieg attack and retreated when their line was broken. Panic broke out in rear areas. The French were so far out of touch with modern warfare that the headquarters did not have a single radio to communicate with subordinate commands.

  But at Tobruk Morshead had terrain that was to his advantage, North Africa was not Europe, and he decided to allow the tanks to push through and go on to be destroyed by anti-tank guns and artillery, behind antitank ditches, in a second line of defence, while the following enemy infantry were to be dealt with by the defending Australian infantry. If tanks and infantry could be separated, each could be dealt with in turn.

  The story of the siege of Tobruk has been told and it is not necessary to repeat detail here. It should be remembered that this was the first time the Germans employing the successful tactics since September 1939 had been defeated in a major land action since the war began.

  3 April 1941

  The first patrol of the day was uneventful, but the second made contact at Sceledina. Hurricanes from 3 and 73 Squadron RAF attacked Ju87s and Bf110s preparing to bomb troops, and claimed to have shot down five, probably destroyed four and damaged two.

  Gordon Steege claimed one Bf110 destroyed, Peter Turnbull four Bf110s destroyed, Alan Rawlinson claimed three Ju87s destroyed and one damaged, and Lieutenant Smith a Ju87, with damaged Ju87s claimed by Davidson, Saunders and Jackson.

  On 5 April the second patrol of five Hurricanes with three from 73 Squadron engaged nine Ju87s of II/StG2 south of Barce pass, with two claimed destroyed by 73 Squadron, and two more by Elleston and one by Kloster, but Flying Officer Edwards was killed.

  The third patrol to the same area also engaged Ju87s south of the pass, with claims for three by Perrin, three by Jewell, and one by Jackson, plus two by 73 Squadron, but Squadron Leader Campbell was killed. One
of the Stuka pilots killed was the Staffel leader of IV/StG2.

  The squadron was moving back, and it was found that the captured CR42, a proud possession since January, could not be flown, so it was destroyed at one of the intermediary stops.

  There was no contact next day, but on 7 April the second patrol strafed two Ju52 transports on the ground at Mechili. The next days passed with patrols taking off but no contact made with enemy, until 14 April. The fifth patrol was at 1,000 feet over Tobruk when three Bf110s were seen about to attack, but after the combat no claims were made for destroyed. Two were claimed as probably destroyed and German records admit the loss of one.

  Peter Jeffrey went to Sidi Aziez to attack a SM79 reported on the ground there, but saw nothing. However, he did see four Ju52s flying along the main road and shot down all four in turn as they landed.

  Three Hurricanes over ships bombarding Bardia saw three Bf110s that dived away and the patrol leader, Peter Turnbull, thought this was an obvious trick to lead them into a trap, so broke off the chase.

  The next days were without contact, and on 19 April the squadron was sent to Aboukir for ten days leave and then to re-equip. The first mention of the Tomahawk in the unit war diary included its armament – two .50-calibre and four .30-calibre machineguns.

  The departure of 3 Squadron coincided with the arrival of Messerschmitt Bf109E fighters of I Gruppe JG27 (I/JG27).

  In the battles over France and England the unit had claimed a total of 93 victories, as well as having flown on operations over Malta and Yugoslavia. The leaders were all proven, and had respectable scores, being ‘experten’ in Luftwaffe terminology.

  When looking at the claims of Luftwaffe personnel, it should be remembered that all air forces over-claimed, and that it is proven that the Luftwaffe over-claimed by a factor of three in the Battle of Britain.

  In this form was the seeds of the eventual destruction of the Luftwaffe. The RAF, and British Commonwealth nations began large-scale training of air crews when the Munich Agreement of 1938 was signed. Behind prime minister Neville Chamberlain’s statement of ‘peace in our time’ was the brutal acceptance that Nazi Germany was not to be trusted and re-arming was necessary. Squadrons and higher head-quarters were formed when the war began and while this meant many relatively inexperienced people were promoted to command and to lead men just out of the training process.

  As time passed and the sheer necessity of acquiring skills to stay alive refined and improved the basic squadron standard, the overall effectiveness of the RAF, Commonwealth and, later, US squadrons, resulted in efficient deadly formations that in only the smallest ways resembled the squadrons of 1939-40.

  The Germans, and Japanese, did not begin large-scale training of aircrews until 1943, when it was far too late. The Luftwaffe never underwent the great expansion of the Allied air forces and few new formations were created.

  One result was that some fighter pilots accumulated very large scores, but they and their compatriots were required to fly operationally almost continuously, with the only breaks being on leave or to recover from wounds.

  At this stage of the war, the effects on the air war of the massive expansion by the RAF and Commonwealth air forces were not being felt. Messerschmitt pilots still enjoyed the advantages of being in units with a great amount of experience flying effective aircraft. It would be over a year before this changed.

  Curtiss P-40 Tomahawk

  At the beginning of May the squadron had 24 officer and eight NCO pilots, with 339 other officers, NCOs and airmen on strength. To re-equip with the Tomahawk, the squadron moved by train to Aqir, Palestine, then to Lydda. US personnel instructed the pilots and ground crews on the new aircraft.

  The US pilots were Lieutenants Lewis Meng and William Momyer (‘moe-myer’ – he did not like ‘mom-yer’). Momyer was officially the Assistant Military Attaché for air at the US Embassy in Cairo. He was amazed to find that though aircraft and associated items had been delivered, there was not one manual, book or written piece of information about any item. Instruction proceeded on that basis.

  Later it became known that, in its wisdom, RAF headquarters had with-held all the manuals and relevant technical publications so the content could be issued as official RAF publications. These had to be edited to conform to RAF policies, prepared for publication, printed, warehoused and distributed according to ‘normal’ procedures, which did not take into account the necessity for prompt supply in wartime.

  Meng later flew in the South-West Pacific area, and Momyer became an ace with eight victories with the 33rd Fighter Group, flying P-40s, over North Africa. He flew in Korea and in 1966 commanded the US 7th Air Force in Saigon.

  The new Tomahawk.

  L. to R. Peter Jeffrey, Jock Perrin,

  Alan Rawlinson, Peter Turnbull,

  Pilot Officer Jackmen

  (AWM 008198)

  The first two Tomahawks arrived on 14 May, to be followed by a trickle of others. It was decided that the flying experience of newly-arrived pilots was not enough to allow them to fly a Tomahawk, so a Gauntlet was acquired for their use until their standard of flying was judged to be acceptable. The batch of arrivals had not flown for about five months, so some practice was necessary before going on to a new high-performance fighter.

  There was a spate of landing crashes involving experienced pilots and while no serious injuries resulted, it was obvious the new fighter required attention to its characteristics. Peter Jeffrey informed higher command that the airfield was too short for such use by a unit converting to a new type of aircraft.

  Later it was realised the landing crashes were caused by too-hard touch-downs on hard surfaces, that bent a rod in the retraction gear, and this was coupled with a steerable tail wheel with which the pilots were not familiar.

  On 22 May the squadron was ordered to provide a force of six Hurricanes to deploy to Cyprus. This was to be a temporary force until 80 Squadron could assume the duty. Peter Jeffrey led the first contingent, with Perrin, Arthur, Turnbull, Knowles and Saunders, but he was replaced after a few days by Alan Rawlinson with John Jackson. Until 2 June the Hurricanes flew sweeps along the coast of Turkey, with no contact or sightings.

  At the beginning of June, the squadron had fifteen Tomahawks supplied, but six had been damaged in landing accidents. Peter Jeffrey went to Cairo to discuss posting some NCO pilots to the newly raised RAAF fighter squadrons 450 and 451.

  The first fatal crash in a Tomahawk was on 5 June. Sergeant Norman Evans had arrived at 3 Squadron on 30 April. There were no reliable witnesses to the crash, only local Arabs, who described a steep spiral dive before impact, and it was assumed Evans had somehow got out of control in a manoeuvre, or had blacked out due to G-forces.

  Elsewhere, the Greek campaign ended in an evacuation under fire of the British and Commonwealth forces there, followed by the greatest airborne invasion in history on Crete, and another German victory.

  In another example of his disregard for the opinions of those in dominion and colonial governments and armed forces, Churchill told the Australian government that the Australian commander in the Middle East, General Thomas Blamey, agreed with the decision to send forces to Greece, and told Blamey the Australian government agreed with it. This sort of chicanery did nothing for inter-government relations when discovered.

  The German airborne invasion of Crete was actually a complete defeat for those units involved, and the parachute and glider troops were in process of being defeated when a New Zealand battalion commander on heights overlooking the vital airfield at Maleme lost his nerve and ordered a withdrawal. This allowed the Germans to fly in reinforcements unhindered and so changed the course of the battle, and of warfare.

  Every nation that could afford to do so raised parachute and glider units, which required huge numbers of transport aircraft and a large logistic component to maintain and service the parachutes and gliders. All this was at great expense and absorbed people of high quality, but did not produce strategic res
ults to warrant the total effort.

  In addition, the casualties suffered in the Greek and Crete campaigns, and the loss of transport aircraft, came home in Berlin in a few months when winter arrived and the fighting in Russia was halted. The 400 transports lost in operations in 1940-41 in Holland, Greece and Crete could have supplied the German thrust to Moscow before winter.

  Syria

  On the eighth of June, operations began against Vichy French forces in Syria. The squadron was to fly intensively for the next five weeks, with daily fighter escorts, strafing attacks, patrols and reconnaissances. Alan Rawlinson led many sorties, with the responsibility that came with the role.

  It was feared by the highest command levels that the Vichy French forces would move to Lebanon and allow German forces to land in Syria, so greatly endangering the British posture in the region. Though General Wavell protested, he was ordered to invade Syria and occupy it to prevent German arrival. Wavell’s main concern was to the west, against the Italian and German forces, and the relief of Tobruk. He allocated a small force of Australian, British, Free French and other contingents to the Syrian operation. 3 Squadron was included.